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THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE: A SENSIBLE
STANDARD OF REVIEW
I. INTRODUCTION
The commerce clause' affirmatively grants Congress the power
to regulate commerce among the states. Congressional acts pursuant
to this power are pre-emptive. The extent of state power becomes an
issue only in the absence of congressional legislation. The Constitu-
tion does not specify what the states may do if Congress has not
acted, nor does it specify what qualifies as commerce among the
states.2 From this "great silence" 8 it is inferred that, if Congress has
not spoken, the states have a "residuum of power" to regulate local
affairs even though their actions may affect or regulate interstate
commerce.4
The commerce clause requires that some aspects of trade gener-
ally remain free from state interference. When a state ventures
excessively into the regulation of these aspects of commerce, it "tres-
passes upon national interests."' The commerce clause implicitly
limits states' authority by its explicit grant to Congress. This consti-
tutional negative implication is the specter known as the "dormant"'
commerce clause.
Much litigation and debate has transpired in the name of the
dormant commerce clause. The United States Supreme Court has
defined and refined several methods to determine if state regulations
trespass upon national interests. Courts seeking guidance on dormant
commerce clause analysis will find little consistency in these deci-
© 1987 by Lisa J. Petricone
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, reads: "The Congress shall have Power ... [tlo regu-
late Commerce with Foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with Indian
Tribes .. "
2. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 534-35 (1949).
3. Id.
4. Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767 (1945).
5. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 373 (1976).
6. Webster's Third International Dictionary defines "dormant" as sleeping. This sug-
gests something with the potential for action, but currently at rest. Thus, one commentator
noted, dormancy does not accurately describe the clause's limitation on state regulation; that
which remains dormant is Congress, and not the commerce clause. Eule, Laying the Dormant
Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425, 425 n.1 (1982).
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sions. When considering the validity of state laws, courts have ex-
pressed their frustration with the Court's inconsistencies.'
Section II of this comment examines the history and divergent
views of dormant commerce clause jurisprudence. Next, section III
discusses the breadth and consequences of the confusion. Section IV
analyzes the key United States Supreme Court cases which articulate
the "modern standards." Section IV also highlights the unsettled
state of modern commerce clause principles. Finally, section V pro-
poses a sensible solution to the problem.
II. A HISTORY OF RECURRENT THEMES
Dormant commerce clause jurisprudence has never been consis-
tent. The present state of dormant commerce clause analysis is the
latest stage in a process that has been repeated several times.' The
Supreme Court's first analysis of the limits of state action in Gibbons
v. Ogden9 was premised on the belief that the states were powerless
to regulate and tax interstate commerce." Chief Justice Marshall
adopted the Madisonian view" that the states' inevitable tendency to
pursue their separate interests at the expense of each others' interests
necessitated the national body of Congress to neutralize biased state
actions. 12
Marshall's successor, Roger Brooke Taney, espoused the oppo-
site view,' 8 believing that the "mere grant of power to the general
government cannot. . be construed to be an absolute prohibition to
the exercise of any power over the same subject by the States."' 4 In
his opinion, state commerce regulations were valid unless they con-
flicted with a law of Congress. Thus, the only negative implications
7. "It is when the Court, in the name of the Commerce Clause, has invalidated state
regulation that a consistent rationale has been more difficult to find." American Trucking
Ass'ns, Inc. v. Larson, 683 F.2d 787, 791 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1036 (1982).
8. Tushnet, Rethinking the Dormant Commerce Clause, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 125, 126.
"The Court states some relatively coherent theory of what state regulations of interstate
commerce are permitted; that theory is seen to have consequences that the Court regards as
undesirable; a new theory is developed although the Court pays lip service to the older one."
d.
9. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
10. Id. at 209.
11. THE FEDERALIST Nos. 41, 42 U. Madison).
12. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 321-22 (1978).
13. The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 573-86 (1847). Chief Justice Taney
stated, "It is well known that upon this subject a difference of opinion has existed, and still
exists, among the members of this Court." Id. at 578 (five Justices concurred with Chief
Justice Taney, but each wrote a separate opinion).
14. Id. at 579.
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of the commerce clause came from Congress' power to pre-empt state
action which conflicted with the actual exercise of its legal
authority."5
A. The Cooley Doctrine
These conflicting views and the tension they aroused in the
mid-nineteenth century 6 were finally resolved by the Supreme
Court in Cooley v. Board of Wardens.17 In Cooley, litigants chal-
lenged the constitutionality of a local Pennsylvania law requiring
ships entering or leaving the state to engage a local pilot or pay a fee
into a pilot retirement fund. The Court distinguished between areas
involving commerce in which the states have constitutional power to
regulate and areas in which the states are constitutionally forbidden
to act. It invoked a federal statute which provided that "all pilots
.. .shall continue to be regulated in conformity with existing laws
of the States" to support its conclusion that the "subject" of regula-
tion in Cooley, pilotage, was "local" rather than "national."' 8
The Cooley doctrine rejected the view that congressional com-
merce power is exclusive and that the states have no power to
regulate commerce. However, it did not propose that the states enjoy
limitless power in the absence of congressional legislation. 9 Cooley
dictated that states could regulate in matters of commerce so "local"
in character as to demand diverse treatment, and Congress alone
could regulate matters so "national" in character that a single, uni-
form system or plan was necessary."
This Cooley subject matter analysis is often cited as a guide in
modern decisions. The most important case of the post-Cooley era is
Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Railway Co. v. Illinois." The Court
15. L. TRIBE, supra note 12, at 322.
16. Id. at 323-26. The search for some kind of standard to determine the validity of
state actions and alleviate existing doctrinal confusion led the Court to use a series of distinc-
tions: 1) police power regulations = commerce power regulations, 2) direct-indirect action,
and 3) national-local. These imprecise labels were weak in predictive value and were aban-
doned. The latter of these distinctions, national-local, however, is helpful in creating a modern
standard of review.
17. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
18. Id. at 318-19.
19. See, e.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945); Parker v. Brown, 317
U.S. 341 (1943); Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34 (1927); Port Richmond & Bergen
Point Ferry Co. v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 234 U.S. 317 (1914); Wilson v. Black Bird
Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1
(1824).
20. 53 U.S. at 318.
21. 118 U.S. 557 (1886). See L. TRIBE, supra note 12, at 325. Other applications in-
1987]
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held that a state's ban on freight rate discrimination by railroads
could not be enforced on interstate shipments. Following Cooley
principles, the Court determined that the regulations were of a "na-
tional" rather than "local" character, though Congress had not acted
in the area. It reasoned that if states were free to fix their own rules,
all states would do so and commerce would be disrupted.
Cooley's "local/national" distinction, however, needed refine-
ment. 2 It was unclear what limitations, if any, would be imposed on
the states once the "subject" of regulation was determined to be of a
"local" nature. The post-Cooley Supreme Court attempted to refine
the guidelines for permissible state action by formulating the distinc-
tion between "direct" and "indirect" burdens, 23 but eventually
abandoned them as labels "remote from actualities" and
"mechanical." 4
B. A Series of Balancing Tests
The quest for a more adequate articulation of the applicable
criteria led to Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona. 5 Justice Stone's
interpretation of the dormant commerce clause involved a detailed
approach to determine which state action would be allowed and
which would not. 6 State regulation affecting interstate commerce
would only be upheld if it was rationally related to a legitimate state
end and if the burden imposed on interstate commerce was out-
weighed by state interest.2 7 The Court invalidated a statute limiting
the length of trains operating within the state, deeming it an uncon-
stitutional burden on commerce. After "balancing" state and national
elude Ex parte McNeil, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 236 (1872), and Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S.
(3 Wall.) 713 (1866).
22. L. TRIBE, supra note 12, at 325. By the time of the Wabash decision, it had already
become clear that the classification of regulatory subject matter as "national" or "local," like
the earlier dichotomy between "police" and "commerce" regulations, was more conclusory
than explanatory.
23. Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34 (1927). The Court labelled "direct" those
state actions whose burden on interstate commerce was considered invalid and "indirect" those
which were allowable.
24. Id. at 44 (Stone, J., dissenting).
25. 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
26. Tushnet, supra note 8, at 128-29. Stone failed to complete the task of reconstructing
dormant commerce clause doctrine which he began with United States v. Carolene Prods. Co.,
304 U.S. 144 (1938). Professor Tushnet believes Stone failed to understand what sorts of
justifications were needed for judicial intervention, noting that, "the result has been doctrinal
confusion as discredited doctrines are covertly relied on and sensible doctrines are only fleet-
ingly glimpsed." Tushnet, supra note 8, at 128-29.
27. 325 U.S. at 770-71.
[Vol. 27
DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
interests, the Court concluded that the obstruction to interstate train
operation was far greater than the alleged safety factor which was
not even lessened by the regulation.
In Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc.2" this balancing test was
applied to an Illinois statute requiring the use of special mudguards
on trucks. Evidence indicated that these mudguards may have been
more dangerous than the conventional mudguards. Also, because
conventional mudguards were required in Arkansas, trucks traveling
between Arkansas and Illinois would have had to change equipment
at the border. After balancing the interests involved, the Court found
that the burden on interstate commerce outweighed the professed
safety interest of the state. 29
The Court further delineated its view of "balancing" in Pike v.
Bruce Church, Inc.30 Pike set the modern standard for analysis of
state action affecting interstate commerce. Arizona required that all
cantaloupes grown in the state be packed in standard crates identify-
ing them as Arizona-grown. The state was trying to enhance and
protect the reputation of local melon growers. The Court dictated
that:
Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legiti-
mate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce
are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed
on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative
local benefits. If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the
question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden
that will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the
local interests involved, and on whether it could have been pro-
moted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.3 '
The Court found that, although Arizona had a legitimate local pur-
pose, the burden it imposed on interstate commerce (requiring Pike
to spend $200,000 for a packing plant in Arizona to pack his
$700,000 crop) was unacceptable.3 2
In 1979, the Supreme Court, in Hughes v. Oklahoma,"3 re-
structured the Pike analysis. It developed a three-prong test to strike
down an Oklahoma statute that prohibited minnows procured in
Oklahoma waters from being transported outside the state. The
28. 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
29. Id. at 527, 529-30.
30. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
31. Id. at 142 (citations omitted).
32. Id. at 145-46.
33. 441 U.S. 322 (1979), overruling Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
19871
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Court stated that it would judge the state regulation according to the
same general rule which applied to state regulations of other natural
resources.
34
Cases where state highway regulations are challenged under the
commerce clause reveal yet another "balancing" approach in modern
commerce clause jurisprudence. The Supreme Court has often stated
that it is reluctant to use the commerce clause to invalidate state reg-
ulations in the field of safety.3 5 Deference to state regulation is
greater in the field of highway safety regulations than in any other
field.3 6 Challenges to safety regulations must overcome a "strong
presumption of validity."1
37
In the last thirty terms, the Court has invalidated state regula-
tions purportedly enacted in the name of highway safety in only
three cases.3" The most recent of these cases, Kassel v. Consolidated
Freightways Corp., is generally considered the standard of review for
highway safety regulations challenged under the commerce clause.39
34. 441 U.S. al 329. The Court quoted:
If the States have such power a singular situation might result. Pennsylvania
might keep its coal, the Northwest its timber, the mining States their minerals.
And why not the products of the field be brought within this principle? Thus,
enlarged, or without enlargement, its influence on interstate commerce need not
be pointed out.
Id. (quoting West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229, 255-56 (1911)).
35. Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 443 (1978). The Court held
that a Wisconsin statute that precluded the use of 65-foot double trucks violated the commerce
clause. See also cases cited infra note 36.
36. Raymond, 434 U.S. at 443. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449
U.S. 456 (1981) (upholding a market regulation because of an environmental concern); Broth-
erhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v. Chicago Rock Island & Pac. Ry., 393 U.S.
129 (1968) (upholding Arkansas law requiring crews of a minimum number to operate trains
traveling further than certain distances within the state); Huron Portland Cement v. City of
Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960) (upholding city's smoke abatement regulation despite potential
burden on interstate commerce); South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., Inc.,
303 U.S. 177 (1938) (upholding state regulation which barred trucks greater than a specified
size and weight from state highways); Bradley v. Public Util. Comm'n, 289 U.S. 92 (1933)
(upholding state's refusal to license interstate carrier to travel over congested route).
37. Bibb, 359 U.S. at 524 (1959).
38. Eule, supra note 6, at 437. These cases are Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways
Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981) (the Court held unconstitutional an Iowa statute prohibiting the
use of 65-foot double trailer trucks within it borders); Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice,
434 U.S. 429 (1978) (the Court held unconstitutional a Wisconsin regulation generally barring
trucks longer than 55 feet from the state highways without a permit); and Bibb v. Navajo
Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959) (the Court held unconstitutional an Illinois statute
requiring trucks operating on state highways to be fitted with contour mudguards).
39. The specific issue considered in Kassel, however, has been largely mooted by subse-
quent congressional action. Both the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982 (Pub. L.
No. 97-424, 96 Stat. 2097) and the Department of Transportation Appropriations Act of 1983
(Pub. L. No. 97-369, 96 Stat. 1765) displace state law regarding truck weight, length, and
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The Court struck down an Iowa statute banning most trucks mea-
suring more than 55 feet long. The Court, however, was never able
to render a majority opinion. A four-justice plurality opinion, writ-
ten by Justice Powell, used a balancing approach, weighing the
asserted safety purpose against the degree of interference with inter-
state commerce. Acknowledging the strong presumption of validity
the Court gives to regulations that touch upon safety, especially
highway safety, the plurality noted that these regulations "neverthe-
less may further the purpose so marginally and interfere with
commerce so substantially as to be invalid under the commerce
clause."' The plurality found that the regulation discriminated
against interstate commerce because it bore "disproportionately on
out-of-state residents" due to exemptions favoring local interests.41
The plurality also quoted Justice Blackmun's concurrence in Ray-
mond Motor Transportation, Inc. v. Rice, stating that "if safety jus-
tifications are not illusory, the Court will not second-guess legislative
judgment about their importance in comparison with related burdens
on interstate commerce.' 42
Justice Brennan's concurrence never balanced the interests in-
volved. He considered the protectionist legislation to be per se
unconstitutional.'" In the dissenting opinion, Justices Rehnquist and
Stewart and Chief Justice Burger gave even stronger deference to the
states, stating that they will automatically uphold a transport regula-
tion if the safety interests asserted by the state are more than "slight
or problematical.""
After years of vacillation and striving for a coherent theory, this
is the current foundation upon which to rest dormant commerce
clause analysis.
III. CONFUSION BREEDS CONFUSION
"[Aifter all is said and done ... the jurisprudence of the
'negative side' of the Commerce Clause remains hopelessly
width. G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1984 SUPPLE-
MENT 64.
40. Kassel, 450 U.S. at 670.
41. Id. at 676.
42. Id. at 670 (quoting Raymond, 434 U.S. at 449).
43. 450 U.S. at 680 (Brennan, J., concurring).
44. Id. at 698 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Perhaps the most revealing language in the
Kassel message was Justice Rehnquist's, stating, "the true problem with today's decision is
that it gives no guidance whatsoever to these States as to whether their laws are valid or how
to defend them. . . .Perhaps, after all is said and done, the Court today neither says nor does
very much at all." Id. at 706.
19871
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confused.' 45
Everything from coal to cantaloupes can be an article of inter-
state commerce.' 6 It is not surprising, then, that the courts are
increasingly faced with determining the validity of state regulations
affecting interstate commerce. The Supreme Court in the last decade
has interpreted the dormant commerce clause as a primary issue in
fourteen cases.' 7 This is more than triple the Court's previous an-
nual rate for addressing such cases.'8 Since interstate commerce is
the root of so much activity, in both a litigious and an economic
sense, it is important to have a clear and sensible dormant commerce
clause analysis.'9 Lower courts currently lack a coherent commerce
clause doctrine upon which to judge these important cases.
This comment does not propose to herald the beginnings of a
"Justice-malpractice" petition. Indeed, the Supreme Court somehow
always manages to achieve justice in deciding these cases. But it is
not the court's correctness that confuses; it is its methodology. With-
45. Id.
46. Examples of litigated articles are timber, South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wun-
nicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984); water, Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 (1982); coal mining,
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981); trucks and highways, Raymond
Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978); apples, Hunt v. Washington State Apple
Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977); cantaloupes, Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S.
137 (1970); milk, Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935); pilotage, Cooley, 53
U.S. at 299; and securities, Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir.
1978).
47. South-Central Timber, 467 U.S. at 82; White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr.
Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204 (1983); New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S.
331 (1982); Sporhase v. Nebraska,.458 U.S. 941 (1982); Kassel, 450 U.S. at 662; Reeves, Inc.
v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980); Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, 447 U.S. 27 (1980); Hughes, 441
U.S. 322 (1979); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978); Exxon Corp. v.
Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978); Raymond, 434 U.S. 429 (1978); Hunt, 432 U.S.
333 (1977); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976); and Great Atd. & Pac.
Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366 (1976).
48. From 1953 to 1975, the United States Supreme Court issued only eight opinions
regarding the dormant commerce clause: Allenberg Cotton Co. v. Pittman, 419 U.S. 20 (1974);
Pike, 397 U.S. at 137; Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, 393 U.S. at 129;
Polar Ice Cream & Creamery Co. v. Andrews, 375 U.S. 361 (1964); Head v. New Mexico
Bd. of Examiners in Optometry, 374 U.S. 424 (1963); Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n
v. Continental Air Lines, 372 U.S. 714 (1963); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Say-On-Drugs, 366 U.S.
276 (1961); and Bibb, 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
49. One commentator suggests another reason for rethinking dormant commerce clause
theory. Professor Tushnet, suggests that because of the remoteness of the cases from areas of
major constitutional controversy and because "no one can get very excited over dormant com-
merce cases," they provide a handy ground for developing general ideas about federalism, the
separation of powers, and judicial review. Tushnet's well-developed comment concludes that
the Court has overreached the justification for judicial review, and should adopt a political
theory of review, reviving the notion of substantive due process. Tushnet, supra note 8, at 125.
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out having the benefit of the guidance of coherent theory, lower
courts often render incoherent - or incorrect - opinions.
The following survey of the pertinent Supreme Court cases ex-
poses the variances of the Court's rationale in deciding the constitu-
tionality of state actions. These cases both reveal the Court's goals in
balancing state and federal interests and provide a practical solution
to the problem.
IV. MODERN STANDARDS
Lower courts faced with a dormant commerce clause issue con-
front several purported "modern standards" for review. Although
these standards differ, they are often used interchangeably because of
Supreme Court vacillation from test to test. Such casual application
is legally unsound.
A. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. and Hughes v. Oklahoma Detail an
Approach to Dormant Commerce Clause Analysis
By 1978, the Supreme Court's approach to the dormant com-
merce clause was thought to have coalesced in Pike v. Bruce Church,
Inc. 50 Pike focused on the purpose of the legislation in question. The
Court allows state and local governments to promote local objectives
which have little or no effect on interstate commerce."1 If a legiti-
mate local purpose is found which affects interstate commerce, the
court must balance the burden imposed upon interstate commerce
against the benefits professed by the state's lawmakers.5" If the court
finds the state law to have an impermissible purpose, Pike mandates
that the court apply a per se rule of invalidity." The final stage of
the Pike analysis states that the degree to which a state's burden on
interstate commerce will be tolerated depends on the availability of
less restrictive alternatives. 4 If the reviewing court finds a less re-
strictive alternative to be available to the states, it will invalidate the
more oppressive state law.Hughes v. Oklahoma " reaffirmed the language of Pike and af-
forded the Court a chance to restate the Pike precedent into a con-
venient three-prong test. The Hughes test considers: 1) whether the
50. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).




55. 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
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challenged statute regulates even-handedly with only "incidental" ef-
fects on interstate commerce, or discriminates against interstate com-
merce either on its face or in practical effect; 2) whether the statute
serves a legitimate local purpose; and if so, 3) whether alternative
means could promote this local purpose as effectively without dis-
criminating against interstate commerce. 6 In sum, Pike and Hughes
mandate that states be permitted to promote their legitimate purpose
only in ways consistent with the basic principle that "our economic
unit is the Nation."
57
B. Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Offers a Derivative Test of
Lesser Scrutiny
Commerce clause analysis involves factors beyond those stated
in Pike and Hughes. Specifically, the Court is reluctant to use the
commerce clause to invalidate state regulations in the "local" field of
safety."8 States have the right to promote safety interests, especially
those concerning highway safety and public health and life.5 Thus,
challengers of safety regulations have the burden of overcoming a
stronger presumption of validity. 0
In light of this stronger presumption of validity, it stands to
reason that states regulating an area of safety will be forced to meet
less stringent criteria to prove a regulation's constitutionality. This
was the case with Iowa's ban on double-bottom trucks measuring
more than 55 feet in Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc."'
Though Iowa's ban was found to be unconstitutional, the Court's
criteria differed from the three-prong Hughes or Pike tests.
In Kassel the Court derived its analysis from Pike in much the
same fashion as it had done in the precedential highway case Ray-
mond Motor Transportation, Inc. v. Rice."' Justice Powell's plural-
ity opinion in Kassel focused on the regulation's safety objectives and
weighed the state regulatory concern in light of the extent of the
burden imposed on interstate commerce."8 Powell concluded that the
56. Id. at 337.
57. Id. at 338-39 (quoting Du Mond, 336 U.S. at 537).
58. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
59. See South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177,
184-85 (1938); Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443-44 (1960).
60. Bibb, 359 U.S. at 524.
61. 450 U.S. 662 (1981). Note, however, that the Court warned that the mere incanta-
tion of a purpose to promote the public health or safety does not insulate a state law from
commerce clause attack. Id. at 670.
62. 434 U.S. 429 (1978).
63. 450 U.S. at 668.
[Vol. 27
DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
Iowa law imposed a disproportionate burden on out-of-state inter-
ests.6 ' In this case the special deference traditionally accorded a
state's safety judgment was unwarranted.6 5 Evidence revealed that
65-foot trucks were as safe as 55-foot or 60-foot trucks, thus render-
ing the 60-foot limitation an illusory safety interest.66
But the Court in Kassel split three ways, affirming the lower
court's decision six to three.67 The concurring and dissenting
opinions varied considerably from the plurality opinion. Justice
Brennan's concurrence suggested three principles68 which commerce
clause challenges should take into account. These principles consider
the burden imposed on commerce and the local benefits sought to be
achieved by the state's lawmakers." Stating his disagreement with
Justice Powell's "weighing or balancing," Justice Brennan noted
that in the field of safety, the court must first establish that the in-
tended safety benefit is not illusory, insubstantial, or nonexistent. It
must then defer to the state's lawmakers on the appropriate balance
of interests.7 0
The dissenting opinion also rejected the "weighing" approach of
the plurality. Justice Rehnquist's dissent agreed with Justice Bren-
nan's opinion that the validity of the Iowa statute did not turn on
whether long trucks were less safe than short trucks.7 ' Rehnquist
focused on states' rights and on whether the legislation had a ra-
tional relation to its desired ends. His analysis is comparable to that
of the second prong of the Hughes test72 and the rational basis aspect
of Pike.73 Rehnquist suggested that if there is a valid reason for the
legislation, the details should be left to the Legislature, not the
judiciary.7'
64. Id. at 671.
65. Id. at 678.
66. Id. at 675.
67. Id. at 662. Justices Powell, White, Blackmun and Stevens comprised the plurality.
Justices Brennan and Marshall concurred. Justices Rehnquist and Stewart and Chief Justice
Burger dissented.
68. Id. at 679-80 (Brennan, J., concurring). The three principles are: 1) the courts are
not empowered to second-guess the empirical judgments of lawmakers concerning the utility oflegislation; 2) the burdens imposed on commerce must be balanced against the local benefits
actually sought to be achieved by the state's lawmakers, and not against those suggested after
the fact by counsel; and 3) protectionist legislation is unconstitutional under the commerce
clause, even if the burdens and benefits are related to safety rather than economics.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 681 n.l.
71. Id. at 697 n.8 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
72. Hughes, 441 U.S. at 327. See supra text accompanying note 55.
73. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142. See supra text accompanying note 51.
74. Kassel, 450 U.S. at 699 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
1987]
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In Kassel, none of the Justices embraced the strict Pike/Hughes
standard. A few relied on parts of the Pike analysis, but none
advocated using the Pike and Hughes criteria that consider the avail-
ability of less restrictive standards. Nevertheless, the availability of a
less restrictive alternative is an important aspect of the stricter Pike/
Hughes tests.15 Since it is difficult to imagine a regulation that could
not be substituted with a less severe or less restrictive alternative, the
state Legislatures will invariably be unable to satisfy the stricter
scrutiny of this prong.
Perhaps it was this strict scrutiny that the Justices were trying
to avoid when none of them added this prong to their dormant
commerce clause analysis in Kassel. It appears the Justices were for-
mulating a variation of the Pike/Hughes test which was adaptable to
regulations concerning safety and "perhaps other fields where the
decisions of State lawmakers are deserving of a heightened degree of
deference. ' '7 e
C. The Conflicting Guidance Confuses Lower Courts
Justice Rehnquist feared that, since none of the Kassel opinions
commanded the adherence of a majority of the Court, the case would
"further unsettle" what certainty there may be in the legal principles
which govern decisions of commerce clause cases." His fears were
confirmed by the following cases.
American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Larson7 ' epitomizes a
confused court.7' The case concerned the validity of a Pennsylvania
statute requiring motor carrier vehicles to be inspected periodically.
It would seem that, because the case's issue was the "local" one of
highway safety, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit should
follow Kassel. But the court had to choose between applying Justice
Powell's balancing approach or Justice Rehnquist's "highly deferen-
tial" standard.80 The majority chose the latter"1 and concluded that
75. See generally Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power, 27 VA. L. REV. I,
22 (1940). Professor Dowling noted that this factor tips the scales back against the statute. In
this innovative article, Dowling developed the theory that, in the absence of congressional
action, courts should balance national and local interests in scrutinizing state legislation. Dor-
mant commerce clause history reveals that the Court later adopted his approach in Southern
Pac., 325 U.S. at 768-71.
76. Kassel, 450 U.S. at 681 n.1 (Brennan, J., concurring).
77. Id. at 703 n.13 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
78. 683 F.2d 787 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1036 (1982).
79. See supra note 7.
80. American Trucking Ass'ns, 683 F.2d at 794.
81. Interestingly, the lower court, hesitant to follow the plurality's approach because of
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the Pennsylvania statute did not violate the dormant commerce
clause.
8 2
The dissent in American Trucking Associations, however, did
not realize that, given the case's subject, Kassel was the most fitting
guide. It applied a Pike balancing test, suggesting that a reviewing
court engage in a careful "weighing of the asserted safety purpose
against the degree of interference with interstate commerce."."
In another case, Smith v. District of Columbia,4 judges also
wavered from one standard to another. The issue in this case, the
constitutionality of a police regulation prohibiting the possession of a
police radar detector in a motor vehicle, also seems to lend itself to a
Kassel highway safety analysis. The appellants argued that the reg-
ulation violated the supremacy clause, the commerce clause, and the
due process clause. When addressing the commerce clause challenge,
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals ran into the muddy wa-
ters of dormant commerce clause analysis.
Relying first on "principles enunciated" by the Supreme Court
in Kassel, the court found that the District of Columbia could forbid
the possession of a radar detector in a motor vehicle without offend-
ing the commerce clause.8" The court dismissed the controversies
among the Kassel Justices in a footnote to the opinion.86 It did not
regard the critical differences between the plurality and concurring
opinions as "particularly relevant" to the principles it relied on from
the plurality opinion or the facts of the case before it.8 7
If the court had understood dormant commerce clause analysis,
it would have ended its discussion with Kassel. The case concerned
highway safety, just as in the case of Kassel; there was no need to
satisfy the stricter Pike standards. But the court mistakenly at-
tempted to do so. Citing Pike, it announced that the extent of the
permissible burden depended on the benefit of the regulation to the
state measured against its impact on interstate commerce. 8 Then,
the "inconclusive nature" of the various opinions, also attempted to apply the deferential stan-
dard. It reached the opposite conclusion than did the appeals court. American Trucking As-
sociations v. Larson, 515 F. Supp. 1327, 1338 (M.D. Pa. 1981).
82. American Trucking Ass'ns, 683 F.2d at 795. The majority believed that the "halls
of the state legislature are a more appropriate forum for resolution of these disputes than are
the walls of a judge's chambers." Id.
83. Id. at 803 (Adams, J., dissenting) (quoting Raymond, 434 U.S. at 443).
84. 436 A.2d 53 (D.C. 1981).
85. Id. at 58.
86. Id. at 58 n.6.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 58.
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getting deeper into trouble, it continued to satisfy the strictest prong
of the Pike/Hughes test, asserting that "lesser measures were not
available to accomplish the legislative goal of providing safe
streets."89 It would be difficult to conclude from the Supreme Court's
past decisions that it ever intended a court considering a highway
safety issue to satisfy this strict scrutiny. It is not difficult, however,
to understand the Smith court's mistake, given the unsettled state of
dormant commerce clause doctrine.
V. A PROPOSED APPROACH TO DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
CASES
The preceding analysis highlights the effects of defective dor-
mant commerce clause jurisprudence on lower courts. The discussion
reveals the general patterns adopted by the Supreme Court, which
the states should follow when deciding these cases. These patterns
suggest a sensible standard for dormant commerce clause doctrine.
A. The State Statute's Purpose
The Supreme Court began each of its case analyses by consider-
ing the state statute's purpose.9 If the purpose was permissible, the
Court continued its review. But at this point the Court diverged in
developing its theory. Since the Court never explained its diver-
gence, 91 it is important to concentrate on this crux.
It appears that the route chosen depends on the nature or pur-
pose of the state regulation. In Pike and Hughes, the matters
considered were evaluated according to their consistency with the ba-
sic principle that the economic unit is the nation." That is, states
may not promote their purpose if doing so only benefits those within
their borders, to the detriment of the nation as a whole. Hughes ren-
dered a standard derived from the general rule applied to state regu-
lation of natural resources."3 When the regulation of natural re-
sources is at issue, each state must not selfishly consider its
individual needs. It must defer to that which is best for the entire
89. Id.
90. See supra text accompanying notes 50-51, and notes 61-71 and accompanying text.
91. Professor Tushnet agrees that "[tihe Supreme Court, in attempting to describe what
the courts should do, has done little more than state that, where intervention is appropriate,
the courts should balance local and national interests. But balancing can take many forms."
Tushnet, supra note 8, at 140.
92. See supra text accompanying note 57.




nation. These cases, then, involve matters of national concern.
On the other hand, Kassel concentrated on matters of a local
nature. In this case, the Court began its discussion by stating that the
power to regulate commerce is "never greater than in matters tradi-
tionally of local concern . . . for example, regulations that touch
upon safety - especially highway safety." 9' Courts normally afford
"special deference" to regulations of a local nature because their
burden usually falls on local economic interests and does not unduly
burden interstate commerce." Thus, when the interest is local, the
strict prong is disregarded.
B. Effective Use of the Local/ National Distinction
This distinction between national and local subjects echoes the
Cooley v. Board of Wardens doctrine. 6 Cooley, however, stated that
local statutes regulating subjects peculiar to local interests are valid,
and statutes regulating national subjects are invalid."7 Though draw-
ing a rigid conclusion from this local/national differentiation no
longer makes sense, the distinction itself is useful.
Courts should consider which of the two categories, local or na-
tional, best describes the case before them. If a matter is so local in
nature as to demand diverse treatment,' it should be deemed local.
This occurs where the local knowledge and needs demand different
systems of regulation, often in areas such as safety and public
health." If the issue is one of national concern or one which de-
mands a single, uniform system or plan100 under national standards,
it should be considered national. This flexible "test" would allow
advocates to argue the necessity of either a local standard or a na-
tional plan.
C. The "Tests"
Once the court identifies the category into which the case falls,
it can invoke an appropriate test for that category. There should be
two distinct tests. An examination of past Supreme Court decisions,
94. Kassel, 450 U.S. at 670.
95. Id. at 675.
96. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851). See also supra notes 17-20 and accompanying test.
97. 53 U.S. at 318.
98. Id. at 299. An example of such a "local" area of regulation would include automo-
bile and truck equipment standards. See supra note 46.
99. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
100. See supra note 98. Examples of such "national" areas of concern would include
regulation of water, coal, and timber. See supra note 46.
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namely Pike, Hughes, and Kassel, guides the determination of the
appropriate test. The Hughes three-prong test 1 should govern mat-
ters of national concern. It invokes a stricter scrutiny befitting the
great importance of a regulation affecting a national interest. States
advocating such a regulation would have to convince the court that
less restrictive alternatives were not available. This would be a diffi-
cult task. Oppressive regulations affecting interstate commerce, then,
could not survive this strict scrutiny.
Less scrutiny should be given to regulations of local matters,
which have a lesser impact on the nation. Kassel is an appropriate
guide for deciding the constitutionality of "local" regulations. To for-
mulate a "local" test, it makes most sense to adopt the "highly defer-
ential" standard of Justice Rehnquist's dissent and thus not subject
the state to the stricter Hughes scrutiny. Though the Supreme Court
has not been able to agree upon the standard for determining the
constitutionality of a state's safety-related legislation, aligning the
Justices shows that five Justices rejected the balancing approach in
the area of safety regulations. 1' Also, a more deferential standard
seems better suited to the commonly local safety issues. A state can
best evaluate the health and safety needs particular to its borders.
Finally, courts have been reluctant to superimpose judicial values
over legislative values in safety areas.'08 The "local" test, then,
should measure whether the "strong presumption" of validity ac-
corded the "local" statute overcomes any evidence that the law's ben-
efits are "slight or problematical" or "illusory."10 4 In sum, a regula-
tion of a local matter would trigger a rational basis scrutiny. If the
state's action is rationally related to its desired end, it would be valid.
D. The New Standard in Use
Washington State Building & Construction v. Spellman"'0
was decided in accord with the above proposal. The case involved a
101. Hughes, 441 U.S. at 336. See supra text accompanying note 56.
102. In his Kassel dissent, Justice Rehnquist noted that, "a majority of the Court goes
on record today as agreeing that courts in Commerce Clause cases do not sit to weigh safety
benefits against burdens on commerce when the safety benefits are not illusory." 450 U.S. at
692 n.4. See also American Trucking Ass'ns, 683 F.2d at 795 n.6. The court in this case did
not believe that the Supreme Court's recent decision in Sporhase, 458 U.S. 941 (1982), sug-
gested that a majority of the Justices would adopt a balancing approach in a case involving a
non-discriminatory highway safety regulation. Contra American Trucking Ass'ns, 683 F.2d at
801 n.1 (Adams, J., dissenting).
103. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
104. Kassel, 450 U.S. at 699 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
105. 518 F. Supp. 928 (E.D. Wash. 1981).
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Washington storage ban on all non-medical radioactive waste gener-
ated outside the state. The court cited Kassel's warning that a mere
incantation of a purpose to promote "public health or safety" is not
enough to insulate a state from commerce clause attack.106 The court
no doubt realized that the matter before it, radioactive waste, neces-
sitated a single, uniform national plan or standard. It was a matter
of national concern. Though the court never specified why it did so,
it opted to use the Pike stricter scrutiny standard.
Since the Supreme Court has never clarified the matter, the
Washington court floundered from precedent to precedent in its rea-
soning. But the term "public health and safety" did not deceive the
court into applying a mere rational basis test. Because a national
standard for storing radioactive waste is desirable, the court was cor-
rect in subjecting the regulation to the strict Pike scrutiny.
VI. CONCLUSION
Perhaps the framers of the Constitution should not have been
quite so mute regarding the "great silence" of the Constitution, the
dormant commerce clause. With all the confusion that abounds, it is
no wonder some experts have proposed that we all but do away with
the dormant commerce clause theory."'
This comment has shown that sense can be made of the muddle
by giving substance to the bodiless Supreme Court precedent. As
Justice Cardozo wrote, the commerce clause "was framed upon the
theory that peoples of the several states must sink or swim together,
and that in the long run prosperity and salvation are in union and
not division.""' The states will have a better chance of swimming if
the Supreme Court gives some semblance to the strokes.
Lisa J. Petricone
106. Id. at 934.
107. See, e.g, Eule, supra note 6. Professor Eule proffers a radically diminished role for
the dormant commerce clause. Id. at 428.
108. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935).
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